2020. május 6., szerda

An Overview Of Exploit Packs (Update 25) May 2015


Update May 12, 2015

Added CVE-2015-0359 and updates for CVE-2015-0336


Reference table : Exploit References 2014-2015


Update March 20, 2015

Added CVE-2015-0336

------------------------
Update February 19, 2015

Added Hanjuan Exploit kit and CVE-2015-3013 for Angler 

Update January 24, 2015 
http://www.kahusecurity.com

Added CVE-2015-3010, CVE-2015-3011 for Agler and a few reference articles. 
If you notice any errors, or some CVE that need to be removed (were retired by the pack authors), please let me know. Thank you very much!


Update December 12, 2014


Update Jan 8, 2014

 This is version 20 of the exploit pack table - see the added exploit packs and vulnerabilities listed below.

                                             Exploit Pack Table Update 20                                           
  Click to view or download from Google Apps

I want to give special thanks to Kafeine  L0NGC47,  Fibon and  Curt Shaffer for their help and update they made.  Note the new Yara rules sheet / tab for yara rules for exploit kit.
I also want to thank Kahu securityKafeineMalforsec and all security companies listed in References for their research.

If you wish to be a contributor (be able to update/change the exploits or add yara rules), please contact me :)
If you have additions or corrections, please email, leave post comments, or tweet (@snowfl0w) < thank you!

The Wild Wild West image was created by Kahu Security  - It shows current and retired (retiring) kits.

List of changed kits
Gong Da / GonDad Redkit 2.2 x2o (Redkit Light)Fiesta (=Neosploit)  Cool  Styxy DotkaChef
CVE-2011-3544CVE-2013-2551CVE-2013-2465CVE-2010-0188CVE-2010-0188CVE-2012-5692
CVE-2012-0507CVE-2013-2471CVE-2013-0074/3896CVE-2011-3402CVE-2013-1493
CVE-2012-1723CVE-2013-1493CVE-2013-0431
CVE-2013-0431
CVE-2013-2423
CVE-2012-1889CVE-2013-2460CVE-2013-0634 CVE-2013-1493
CVE-2012-4681CVE-2013-2551 CVE-2013-2423
CVE-2012-5076
CVE-2013-0422
CVE-2013-0634
CVE-2013-2465



Angler FlashPack = SafePack White Lotus Magnitude (Popads)Nuclear 3.x Sweet Orange 
CVE-2013-0074/3896CVE-2013-0074/3896CVE-2011-3544CVE-2011-3402CVE-2010-0188CVE-2013-2423
CVE-2013-0634CVE-2013-2551CVE-2013-2465CVE-2012-0507CVE-2012-1723CVE-2013-2471
CVE-2013-2551 CVE-2013-2551CVE-2013-0634CVE-2013-0422CVE-2013-2551
CVE-2013-5329CVE-2013-2460CVE-2013-2423
CVE-2013-2471 ??CVE-2013-2471CVE-2013-2460
CVE-2013-2551CVE-2013-2551

CK HiManNeutrino  Blackhole (last)Grandsoft  Private EK
CVE-2011-3544CVE-2010-0188CVE-2013-0431CVE-2013-0422CVE-2010-0188 CVE-2006-0003
CVE-2012-1889CVE-2011-3544CVE-2013-2460CVE-2013-2460CVE-2011-3544CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2012-4681CVE-2013-0634CVE-2013-2463*CVE-2013-2471CVE-2013-0422CVE-2011-3544
CVE-2012-4792*CVE-2013-2465CVE-2013-2465*and + all or someCVE-2013-2423CVE-2013-1347
CVE-2013-0422CVE-2013-2551CVE-2013-2551exploitsCVE-2013-2463CVE-2013-1493
CVE-2013-0634* switch 2463*<>2465*from the previousCVE-2013-2423
CVE-2013-3897Possibly + exploitsversionCVE-2013-2460
* removedfrom the previous
version

Sakura 1.x LightsOutGlazunov Rawin Flimkit  Cool EK (Kore-sh)Kore (formely Sibhost) 
cve-2013-2471CVE-2012-1723CVE-2013-2463CVE-2012-0507CVE-2012-1723CVE-2013-2460CVE-2013-2423
CVE-2013-2460CVE-2013-1347cve-2013-2471CVE-2013-1493CVE-2013-2423CVE-2013-2463CVE-2013-2460
and + all or someCVE-2013-1690CVE-2013-2423CVE-2013-2471CVE-2013-2463
exploitsCVE-2013-2465CVE-2013-2471
from the previous
version


Styx 4.0Cool Topic EK Nice EK
CVE-2010-0188CVE-2012-0755CVE-2013-2423CVE-2012-1723
CVE-2011-3402CVE-2012-1876
CVE-2012-1723CVE-2013-0634
CVE-2013-0422CVE-2013-2465
CVE-2013-1493cve-2013-2471
CVE-2013-2423and + all or some
CVE-2013-2460exploits
CVE-2013-2463from the previous
CVE-2013-2472version
CVE-2013-2551
Social Eng








=================================================================

The Explot Pack Table has been updated and you can view it here.

Exploit Pack Table Update 19.1  - View or Download from Google Apps

If you keep track of exploit packs and can/wish  to contribute and be able to make changes, please contact me (see email in my profile)
I want to thank L0NGC47, Fibon, and Kafeine,  Francois Paget, Eric Romang, and other researchers who sent information for their help.




Update April 28, 2013 - added CVE-2013-2423 (Released April 17, 2013) to several packs. 
Now the following packs serve the latest Java exploit (update your Java!)

  1. Styx
  2. Sweet Orange
  3. Neutrino
  4. Sakura
  5. Whitehole
  6. Cool
  7. Safe Pack
  8. Crime Boss
  9. CritX



Other changes
Updated:
  1. Whitehole
  2. Redkit
  3. Nuclear
  4. Sakura
  5. Cool Pack
  6. Blackhole
  7. Gong Da
Added:
  1. KaiXin
  2. Sibhost
  3. Popads 
  4. Alpha Pack
  5. Safe Pack
  6. Serenity
  7. SPL Pack

    There are 5 tabs in the bottom of the sheet
  1. 2011-2013
  2. References
  3. 2011 and older
  4. List of exploit kits
  5. V. 16 with older credits



March 2013
The Explot Pack Table, which has been just updated, has migrated to Google Apps - the link is below. The new format will allow easier viewing and access for those who volunteered their time to keep it up to date.

In particular, I want to thank
L0NGC47, Fibon, and Kafeine  for their help.

There are 5 tabs in the bottom of the sheet
  1. 2011-2013
  2. References
  3. 2011 and older
  4. List of exploit kits
  5. V. 16 with older credits
The updates include
  1. Neutrino  - new
  2. Cool Pack - update
  3. Sweet Orange - update
  4. SofosFO aka Stamp EK - new
  5. Styx 2.0 - new
  6. Impact - new
  7. CritXPack - new
  8. Gong Da  - update
  9. Redkit - update
  10. Whitehole - new
  11. Red Dot  - new





The long overdue Exploit pack table Update 17 is finally here. It got a colorful facelift and has newer packs (Dec. 2011-today) on a separate sheet for easier reading.
Updates / new entries for the following 13 packs have been added (see exploit listing below)


  1. Redkit 
  2. Neo Sploit
  3. Cool Pack
  4. Black hole 2.0
  5. Black hole 1.2.5
  6. Private no name
  7. Nuclear 2.2 (Update to 2.0 - actual v. # is unknown)
  8. Nuclear 2.1  (Update to 2.0 - actual v. # is unknown)
  9. CrimeBoss
  10. Grandsoft
  11. Sweet Orange 1.1 Update to 1.0 actual v. # is unknown)
  12. Sweet Orange 1.0
  13. Phoenix  3.1.15
  14. NucSoft
  15. Sakura 1.1 (Update to 1.0  actual v. # is unknown)
  16. AssocAID (unconfirmed)  






Exploit lists for the added/updated packs


AssocAID (unconfirmed)
09-'12
CVE-2011-3106
CVE-2012-1876
CVE-2012-1880
CVE-2012-3683
Unknown CVE
5


Redkit
08-'12
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2012-0507
CVE-2012-4681
3

Neo Sploit
09-'12
CVE-2012-1723
CVE-2012-4681
2?

Cool
08-'12
CVE-2006-0003
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2011-3402
CVE-2012-0507
CVE-2012-1723
CVE-2012-4681
5

Black hole 2.0
09-'12
CVE-2006-0003
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2012-0507
CVE-2012-1723
CVE-2012-4681
CVE-2012-4969 promised
5

Black hole 1.2.5
08-'12
CVE-2006-0003
CVE-2007-5659 /2008-0655
CVE-2008-2992
CVE-2009-0927
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2010-1885
CVE-2011-0559
CVE-2011-2110
CVE-2012-1723
CVE-2012-1889
CVE-2012-4681
11

Private no name
09-'12
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2012-1723
CVE-2012-4681
3

Nuclear 2.2 (Update to 2.0 - actual v. # is unknown)
03-'12
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2011-3544
CVE-2012-1723
CVE-2012-4681
4

Nuclear 2.1 (Update to 2.0 - actual v. # is unknown)
03-'12
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2011-3544
CVE-2012-1723
3

CrimeBoss
09-'12
Java Signed Applet
CVE-2011-3544
CVE-2012-4681
3

Grandsoft
09-'12
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2011-3544
2?

Sweet Orange 1.1
09-'12
CVE-2006-0003
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2011-3544
CVE-2012-4681
4?

Sweet Orange 1.0
05-'12
CVE-2006-0003
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2011-3544
3?

Phoenix  3.1.15
05-'12
CVE-2010-0842
CVE: 2010-0248
CVE-2011-2110
CVE-2011-2140
CVE: 2011-2371
CVE-2011-3544
CVE-2011-3659
Firefox social
CVE: 2012-0500
CVE-2012-0507
CVE-2012-0779
11

NucSoft
2012
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2012-0507
2

Sakura 1.1
08-'12
CVE-2006-0003
CVE-2010-0806
CVE-2010-0842
CVE-2011-3544
CVE-2012-4681
5


Version 16. April 2, 2012

Thanks to Kahu security
for Wild Wild West graphic 

The full table in xls format - Version 16 can be downloaded from here. 



 










ADDITIONS AND CHANGES:

1. Blackhole Exploit Kit 1.2.3
Added:
  1. CVE-2011-0559 - Flash memory corruption via F-Secure
  2. CVE-2012-0507 - Java Atomic via Krebs on Security
  3. CVE-2011-3544 - Java Rhino  via Krebs on Security
2. Eleonore Exploit Kit 1.8.91 and above- via Kahu Security
Added:
  1. CVE-2012-0507 - Java Atomic- after 1.8.91was released
  2. CVE-2011-3544 - Java Rhino
  3. CVE-2011-3521 - Java Upd.27  see Timo HirvonenContagio, Kahu Security and Michael 'mihi' Schierl 
  4. CVE-2011-2462 - Adobe PDF U3D
Also includes
"Flash pack" (presumably the same as before)
"Quicktime" - CVE-2010-1818 ?
3. Incognito Exploit Pack v.2 and above 
there are rumors that Incognito development stopped after v.2 in 2011 and it is a different pack now. If you know, please send links or files.

Added after v.2 was released:
  1. CVE-2012-0507 - Java Atomic
See V.2 analysis via StopMalvertizing

4. Phoenix Exploit Kit v3.1 - via Malware Don't Need Coffee
Added:
  1. CVE-2012-0507 -  Java Atomic
  2. CVE-2011-3544 -  Java Rhino + Java TC (in one file)

5. Nuclear Pack v.2 - via TrustWave Spiderlabs


  1. CVE-2011-3544 Oracle Java Rhino
  2. CVE-2010-0840 JRE Trusted Method Chaining
  3. CVE-2010-0188 Acrobat Reader  – LibTIFF
  4. CVE-2006-0003 MDAC
6. Sakura Exploit Pack > v.1 via DaMaGeLaB

  1. CVE-2011-3544 - Java Rhino (It was in Exploitpack table v15, listing it to show all packs with this exploit)

7. Chinese Zhi Zhu Pack via Kahu Security and Francois Paget (McAfee)
  1. CVE-2012-0003 -  WMP MIDI 
  2. CVE-2011-1255 - IE Time Element Memory Corruption
  3. CVE-2011-2140 - Flash 10.3.183.x
  4. CVE-2011-2110 - Flash 10.3.181.x 
  5. CVE-2010-0806 - IEPeers

8. Gong Da Pack via Kahu Security 
  1. CVE-2011-2140  - Flash 10.3.183.x
  2. CVE-2012-0003 -  WMP MIDI  
  3. CVE-2011-3544 - Java Rhino 





  1. CVE-2010-0886 - Java SMB
  2. CVE-2010-0840 - JRE Trusted Method Chaining
  3. CVE-2008-2463 - Snapshot
  4. CVE-2010-0806 - IEPeers
  5. CVE-2007-5659/2008-0655 - Collab.collectEmailInfo
  6. CVE-2008-2992 - util.printf
  7. CVE-2009-0927 - getIco
  8. CVE-2009-4324 - newPlayer



Version 15. January 28, 2012

Additions - with many thanks to Kahu Security

 Hierarchy Exploit Pack
=================
CVE-2006-0003
CVE-2009-0927
CVE-2010-0094
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2010-0806
CVE-2010-0840
CVE-2010-1297
CVE-2010-1885
CVE-2011-0611
JavaSignedApplet


Siberia Private
==========
CVE-2005-0055
CVE-2006-0003
CVE-2007-5659
CVE-2008-2463
CVE-2008-2992
CVE-2009-0075
CVE-2009-0927
CVE-2009-3867
CVE-2009-4324
CVE-2010-0806


Techno XPack
===========
CVE-2008-2992
CVE-2010-0188
CVE-2010-0842
CVE-2010-1297
CVE-2010-2884
CVE-2010-3552
CVE-2010-3654
JavaSignedApplet


"Yang Pack"
=========
CVE-2010-0806
CVE-2011-2110
CVE-2011-2140
CVE-2011-354




Version 14. January 19, 2012


Version 14 Exploit Pack table additions:

Credits for the excellent Wild Wild West (October 2011 edition) go to kahusecurity.com

With many thanks to  XyliBox (Xylitol - Steven),  Malware Intelligence blog,  and xakepy.cc for the information:

  1. Blackhole 1.2.1  (Java Rhino added, weaker Java exploits removed)
  2. Blackhole 1.2.1 (Java Skyline added)
  3. Sakura Exploit Pack 1.0  (new kid on the block, private pack)
  4. Phoenix 2.8. mini (condensed version of 2.7)
  5. Fragus Black (weak Spanish twist on the original, black colored admin panel, a few old exploits added)
If you find any errors or CVE information for packs not featured , please send it to my email (in my profile above, thank you very much) .
























 
The full table in xls format - Version 14 can be downloaded from here. 

The exploit pack table in XLSX format
The exploit pack table in csv format 

P.S. There are always corrections and additions thanks to your feedback after the document release, come back in a day or two to check in case v.15 is out.



Version 13. Aug 20, 2011


Kahusecurity issued an updated version of their Wild Wild West graphic that will help you learn Who is Who in the world of exploit packs. You can view the full version of their post in the link above.

Version 13 exploit pack table additions:
  1. Bleeding Life 3.0
  2. Merry Christmas Pack (many thanks to kahusecurity.com)+
  3. Best Pack (many thanks to kahusecurity.com)
  4. Sava Pack (many thanks to kahusecurity.com)
  5. LinuQ 
  6. Eleonore 1.6.5
  7. Zero Pack
  8. Salo Pack (incomplete but it is also old)



List of packs in the table in alphabetical order
  1. Best Pack
  2. Blackhole Exploit 1.0
  3. Blackhole Exploit 1.1
  4. Bleeding Life 2.0
  5. Bleeding Life 3.0
  6. Bomba
  7. CRIMEPACK 2.2.1
  8. CRIMEPACK 2.2.8
  9. CRIMEPACK 3.0
  10. CRIMEPACK 3.1.3
  11. Dloader
  12. EL Fiiesta
  13. Eleonore 1.3.2
  14. Eleonore 1.4.1
  15. Eleonore 1.4.4 Moded
  16. Eleonore 1.6.3a
  17. Eleonore 1.6.4
  18. Eleonore 1.6.5
  19. Fragus 1
  20. Icepack
  21. Impassioned Framework 1.0
  22. Incognito
  23. iPack
  24. JustExploit
  25. Katrin
  26. Merry Christmas Pack
  27. Liberty  1.0.7
  28. Liberty 2.1.0*
  29. LinuQ pack
  30. Lupit
  31. Mpack
  32. Mushroom/unknown
  33. Open Source Exploit (Metapack)
  34. Papka
  35. Phoenix  2.0 
  36. Phoenix 2.1
  37. Phoenix 2.2
  38. Phoenix 2.3
  39. Phoenix 2.4
  40. Phoenix 2.5
  41. Phoenix 2.7
  42. Robopak
  43. Salo pack
  44. Sava Pack
  45. SEO Sploit pack
  46. Siberia
  47. T-Iframer
  48. Unique Pack Sploit 2.1
  49. Webattack
  50. Yes Exploit 3.0RC
  51. Zero Pack
  52. Zombie Infection kit
  53. Zopack


----------------------------------------------
Bleeding Life 3.0
New Version Ad is here 

Merry Christmas Pack
read analysis at
kahusecurity.com
  
Best Pack
read analysis at 
kahusecurity.com
Sava Pack
read analysis at
kahusecurity.com
Eleonore 1.6.5 
[+] CVE-2011-0611
[+] CVE-2011-0559
[+] CVE-2010-4452
[-] CVE-2010-0886
Salo Pack
Old (2009), added just for
the collection


Zero Pack
62 exploits from various packs (mostly Open Source pack)
LinuQ pack
Designed to compromise linux servers using vulnerable PHPMyAdmin. Comes with DDoS bot but any kind of code can be loaded for Linux botnet creation.
LinuQ pack is PhpMyAdmin exploit pack with 4 PMA exploits based on a previous Russian version of the Romanian PMA scanner ZmEu. it is not considered to be original, unique, new, or anything special. All exploits are public and known well.


It is designed to be installed on an IRC server (like UnrealIRCD). IP ranges already listed in bios.txt can be scanned, vulnerable IPs and specific PMA vulnerabilities will be listed in vuln.txt, then the corresponding exploits can be launched against the vulnerable server. It is more like a bot using PMA vulnerabilities than exploit pack.
It is using
CVE-2009-1148 (unconfirmed)
CVE-2009-1149 (unconfirmed)
CVE-2009-1150 (unconfirmed)
CVE-2009-1151 (confirmed)




 ====================================================================
Version 12. May 26, 2011
additional changes (many thanks to kahusecurity.com)
Bomba
Papka

See the list of packs covered in the list below


The full table in xls format - Version 12 can be downloaded from here.
I want to thank everyone who sent packs and information  :)





Version 11 May 26, 2011 Changes:
    1. Phoenix2.7
    2. "Dloader" (well, dloader is a loader but the pack is  some unnamed pack http://damagelab.org/lofiversion/index.php?t=20852)
    3. nuclear pack
    4. Katrin
    5. Robopak
    6. Blackhole exploit kit 1.1.0
    7. Mushroom/unknown
    8. Open Source Exploit kit






    ====================================================================

    10. May 8, 2011 Version 10        Exploit Pack Table_V10May11
    First, I want to thank everyone who sent and posted comments for updates and corrections. 

    *** The Wild Wild West picture is from a great post about evolution of exploit packs by Kahu Security  Wild Wild West Update


    As usual, send your corrections and update lists.


    Changes:
    • Eleonore 1.6.4
    • Eleonore 1.6.3a
    • Incognito
    • Blackhole
    Go1Pack  (not included) as reported as being a fake pack, here is a gui. Here is a threatpost article referencing it as it was used for an attack 
    Also, here is another article claiming it is not a fake http://community.websense.com/blogs/securitylabs/archive/2011/04/19/Mass-Injections-Leading-to-g01pack-Exploit-Kit.aspx
    Go1 Pack CVE are reportedly
    CVE-2006-0003
    CVE-2009-0927
    CVE-2010-1423
    CVE-2010-1885

    Does anyone have this pack or see it offered for sale?

    Exploit kits I am planning to analyze and add (and/or find CVE listing for) are:

    • Open Source Exploit Kit
    • SALO
    • K0de

    Legend: 
    Black color entries by Francois Paget
    Red color entries by Gunther
    Blue color entries by Mila

    Also, here is a great presentation by Ratsoul (Donato Ferrante) about Java Exploits (http://www.inreverse.net/?p=1687)

    --------------------------------------------------------
     9.  April 5, 2011  Version 9        ExploitPackTable_V9Apr11

    It actually needs another update but I am posting it now and will issue version 10 as soon as I can.

    Changes:
    Phoenix 2.5
    IFramer
    Tornado
    Bleeding life

    Many thanks to Gunther for his contributions.
    If you wish to add some, please send your info together with the reference links. Also please feel free to send corrections if you notice any mistakes






    8. Update 8 Oct 22, 2010 Version 8 ExploitPackTable_V8Oct22-10

    Changes: 
    1. Eleonore 1.4.4 Moded added (thanks to malwareint.blogspot.com)
    2. Correction on CVE-2010-0746 in Phoenix 2.2 and 2.3. It is a mistake and the correct CVE is CVE-2010-0886 (thanks to etonshell for noticing)
    3. SEO Sploit pack added (thanks to whsbehind.blogspot.com,  evilcodecave.blogspot.com and blog.ahnlab.com)


    7. Update 7 Oct 18, 2010 Version 7 ExploitPackTable_V7Oct18-10 released
     thanks to SecNiche we have updates for Phoenix 2.4 :)
      
    We also added shorthand/slang/abbreviated names for exploits for easy matching of exploits to CVE in the future. Please send us more information re packs, exploit names that can be added in the list. Thank you!

     
    6. Update 6 Sept 27, 2010 Version 6 ExploitPackTable_V6Sept26-10 released
     Thanks to Francois Paget (McAfee) we have updates for Phoenix 2.2 and Phoenix 2.3


    5. Update 5. Sept 27, 2010 Version 5 ExploitPackTable_V5Sept26-10 released
    Added updates for Phoenix 2.1 and Crimepack 3.1.3

      
    4 Update 4  July 23, 2010  Version 4 ExploitPackTable_V4Ju23-10 released. Added a new Russian exploit kit called Zombie Infection Kit to the table. Read more at malwareview.com
    Update 3  July 7, 2010. Please read more about this on the Brian Krebs' blog Pirate Bay Hack Exposes User Booty 
    Update 2 June 27, 2010 Sorry but Impassioned Framework is back where it belongs - blue
    Update 1 June 24, 2010 Eleonore 1.4.1 columns was updated to include the correct list of the current exploits.

    Francois Paget  www.avertlabs.com kindly agreed to allow us to make additions to his Overview of Exploit Packs table published on Avertlabs (McAfee Blog)

    Many thanks to Gunther from ARTeam for his help with the update. There are a few blanks and question marks, please do no hesitate to email me if you know the answer or if you see any errors.



    Please click on the image below to expand it (it is a partial screenshot)  Impassioned Framework is tentatively marked a different color because the author claims it is a security audit tool not exploit pack. However, there was no sufficient information provided yet to validate such claims. The pack is temporarily/tentatively marked a different color. We'll keep you posted.


    More articles


    Scanning For Padding Oracles

    As you might have heard, we recently got our paper on padding oracle attacks accepted to the USENIX Security Conference. In this paper, we describe and evaluate a scanning methodology with which we found several padding oracle vulnerabilities in devices from various vendors. In total, we found that 1.83% of the Alexa Top 1 Million have padding oracle vulnerabilities.

    To test whether a server is vulnerable, we specified different padding oracle vectors which we send to the system under test, using different cipher suites and protocol versions. If the server does not behave identically (on both the TLS and TCP layers), we consider it to be vulnerable to a padding oracle attack, since it is leaking information about the plaintext via behavior differences. Depending on the responses to such padding oracle vectors, one can estimate which implementation is responsible for the vulnerability. We contacted quite a few website owners and tried to cooperate with them, to find out which vendors and TLS stacks are responsible for the identified vulnerabilities. You can find our current disclosure status on this issue on https://github.com/RUB-NDS/TLS-Padding-Oracles.
    We are currently in contact with other vendors to fix the remaining vulnerabilities, but the some of the rare (in terms of the number of affected hosts) vulnerabilities are currently not attributed. To fix the remaining vulnerabilities, we ask for your assistance to help get rid of this issue. For this purpose, we integrated a standalone version of our padding oracle evaluation tool into our TLS-Scanner (v.2.7) project. This tool allows you (among other things) to evaluate if a specific server is vulnerable.

    When the tool detects a vulnerability, it tries to attribute the vulnerability to a specific vendor or CVE. If we already know of the vulnerability of the server you scanned, the tool will print its details. If the tool does not have a description of the vulnerability in its database, it will ask you to notify us about the vulnerable server, such that we can notify the vendor and get the device fixed. To be clear: the tool never sends any data to us - you have the choice of whether to notify us (and what details to include). There is a chance that the tool's attribution is also mistaken, that is, the tool lists a vendor for your host, but you know for sure that you do not use an implementation by this vendor. Please contact us in such cases as well.

    How to use the Tool

    First, you need to grab hold of the tool. There are 3 ways to get your hands dirty: pre-compiled, self-compiled or Docker. We provide a pre-compiled version of the tool since the compilation process can get quite messy if you are not familiar with java and maven. You can directly download the resulting project here. However, if you also want to play around with the code, you have to compile everything yourself.

    Building the TLS-Scanner

    For this, you will need (Git), maven (sudo apt-get install maven), OpenJDK-8  (I can guarantee that this version works, other versions might work as well, have not tested it).

    You will need to get TLS-Attacker 2.9 (if you do not already have it):
    Now we can clone and install the TLS-Scanner

    Docker

    We also provide a Dockerfile, which lets you run the scanner directly

    Getting Started


    If you start the TLS-Scanner you should be greeted by a usage info, similar to the one below:

     or


    This should give you an overview of the supported command line flags. The only really required one is the -connect flag (similar to OpenSSL and TLS-Attacker), with which you specify which host to scan. The most basic command is therefore:

    Your output may look something like this:

    By default, TLS-Scanner will run single-threaded. In such cases the scanning will take a while; just how long it will take depends on your server configuration. The scanner also supports multi-threading, which drastically improves the performance. There are two parameters to play around with, -threads, which controls how many different "probes" are executed in parallel, and -aggressive , which controls how many handshakes can be executed simultaneously. If you want the fastest results the following parameters are usually a good choice:

    But lets get back to the results of the Scanner. Currently the Scanner supports a bunch of well known tests, like supported ciphersuites or protocol versions. These are very similar to what you may be used to from other scanners like ssllabs or testssl.sh.

    Padding Oracles

    The main advantage of our scanner is the ability to scan for padding oracle vulnerabilities (which is probably why you are reading this post). You will see if you are vulnerable in the "Attack Vulnerabilities" section. For example, when scanning hackmanit.de, the result is false. Good for us! But as you might have seen there is also another section in the scanner report:"PaddingOracle Responsemap"
    This section lists the responses of the scanned host for each padding oracle vector, for each cipher suite and protocol version. For hackmanit.de, there is no detected difference in responses, which means hackmanit.de is not vulnerable to the attack:
    If we want, we can also look at the concrete responses of the server. For this purpose, we start the scanner with the -reportDetail flag:

    With this flag we now get the following details:

    So what does this all mean? First of all, we named our malformed records. The interpretation of those names is visualized in the following table:
    BasicMac-<position>-<XOR>  A Record with ApplicationData, MAC and padding bytes, where the padding byte at <position> is XOR'd <XOR>
     MissingMacByteFirst A Record without ApplicationData, where the first byte of the MAC is missing
     MissingMacByteLast A Record without ApplicationData, where the last byte of the MAC is missing
     Plain FF A Record without ApplicationData & MAC which only contains Paddingbytes: 64* 0xFF 
     Plain 3F A Record without ApplicationData & MAC which only contains Paddingbytes: 64* 0xF3
     InvPadValMac-[<position>]-<appDataLength>-<paddingBytes> A Record with invalid padding and valid MAC. The Record contains <appDataLength> many ApplicationData bytes and <paddingBytes> many PaddingBytes. The Padding is invalid at <position>.
     ValPadInvMac-[<position>]-<appDataLength>-<paddingBytes> A Record with valid padding and invalid MAC. The Record contains <appDataLength> many ApplicationData bytes and <paddingBytes> many PaddingBytes. The MAC is invalid at <position>.
     InvPadInvMac-[<position>]-<appDataLength>-<paddingBytes> A Record with invalid padding and invalid MAC. The Record contains <appDataLength> many ApplicationData bytes and <paddingBytes> many PaddingBytes. The MAC is invalid at the first position. The Padding is invalid at <position>.

    Next to the name you can see what the actual response from the server was. Alert messages which are in [] brackets indicate that the alert was a fatal alert while () brackets indicate a warning alert. ENC means that the messages were encrypted (which is not always the case). The last symbol in each line indicates the state of the socket. An X represents a closed socket with a TCP FIN, a T indicates that the socket was still open at the time of measurement and an @ indicates that the socket was closed with an RST. So how did Hackmanit respond? We see a [BAD_RECORD_MAC]  ENC X, which means we received an ENCrypted FATAL BAD_RECORD_MAC alert, and the TCP connection was closed with a TCP FIN. If a server appears to be vulnerable, the scanner will execute the scan a total of three times to confirm the vulnerability. Since this response is identical to all our vectors, we know that the server was not vulnerable and the scanner is not re-executing the workflows.

    Here is an example of a vulnerable host:
    As you can see, this time the workflows got executed multiple times, and the scanner reports the cipher suite and version as vulnerable because of "SOCKET_STATE". This means that in some cases the socket state revealed information about the plaintext. If you look closely, you can see that for ValPadInvMac-[0]-0-59, ValPadInvMac-[8]-0-59 and ValPadInvMac-[15]-0-59 the server failed to close the TCP socket, while for all other vectors the TCP connect was closed with a TCP FIN. The server was therefore vulnerable.

    Since the server was vulnerable, TLS-Scanner will also print an additional section: "PaddingOracle Details"

    In this section we try to identify the vulnerability. In the example above, TLS-Scanner will print the following:

    As you can see, we attribute this vulnerability to OpenSSL <1.0.2r. We do so by looking at the exact responses to our malformed records. We additionally print two important facts about the vulnerability: Whether it is observable and its strength. The precise details of these properties are beyond the scope of this blogpost, but the short version is:
    If an oracle is observable, a man in the middle attacker can see the differences between the vectors by passively observing the traffic, without relying on browser or application specific tricks. A strong oracle has no limitations in the number of consecutive bytes an attacker can decrypt. If an oracle is STRONG and OBSERVABLE, then an attacker can realistically exploit it. This is the case in the example above.
    For more details on this, you will have to wait for the paper.

    Attribution

    As you can see, we try to fingerprint the responsible device/implementation. However, we were not able to identify all vulnerable implementations yet. If we cannot attribute a vulnerability you will receive the following message:

    Could not identify the vulnerability. Please contact us if you know which software/hardware is generating this behavior.

    If you encounter this message, we do not know yet who is responsible for this padding oracle and would be happy to know which device/vendor is responsible. If you know who is, please contact us so that we can get in contact with the vendor to fix the issue. To reiterate, the tool never sends any data back to us, and it is your choice whether to contact us manually or not.

    There are also some cases in which we can identify the vendor, but the vendor has not patched the vulnerability yet. If you encounter such a host, the scanner will tell you that we know the responsible vendor. To prevent abuse, we do not include further details.

    Non-Determinism and Errors

    In some cases, the scanner is unable to scan for padding oracles and reports ERROR or non-deterministic responses. The ERROR cases appear if the scanner failed could not handshake with the specified cipher suite and protocol version. This might be due to a bug in the tested TLS-Server or a bug in TLS-Attacker or TLS-Scanner. If you think the handshake fails because of an issue on our side, please open an issue on Github, and we will investigate. The more interesting cases are the non-deterministic ones. In such cases the scanner observed non-identical scan results in three separate scans. This can be due to non-determinism in the software, connection errors, server load or non-homogeneous load balancing. Currently, you will have to analyze these cases manually. In the paper, we excluded such hosts from our study because we did not want to artificially improve our results. But we understand that you as a tester want to know if the server is vulnerable or not. If the server is not truly vulnerable you would see the differences between the answers spread across all the different vectors. If the differences only appear on a subset of malformed records the server is very likely vulnerable. If you are unsure, you can also always scan multiple times (or scan slowly), increase the timeout, or if you are entirely lost get in touch with us. 


    How YOU can help

    Please use the scanner on all your hosts and check for padding oracle vulnerabilities. If the scanner can identify your vulnerability, a patch should already be available. Please patch your system! If the scanner does not identify the vulnerability (and instructs you to contact us), please contact us with the details (robert.merget@rub.de). If you can provide us with the detailed output of the scanner or even better, the name of the host, with the corresponding vendor, we could match the results with our database and help fix the issue. We can already attribute over 90% of the vulnerabilities, but there is still a lot to be discovered. We mostly scanned the Alexa top 1-million on port 443. Other protocols like IMAPS, POP3S, etc. might have different implementations with different vulnerabilities. If you find vulnerabilities with our tool, please give us credit. It helps us to get more funding for our project.

    Issues with the Scanner


    A notable feature of our scanner is that we do not actively try to avoid intolerances (like not scanning with a lot of cipher suites in the Hello messages etc.). We believe that doing so would hide important bugs. We are currently experimenting with intolerances checks, but the feature is now still in beta. If we cannot scan a server (most of the time due to intolerances or SNI problems), the scanner will report a lot of intolerances and usually no supported protocol versions. Some intolerances may trick the scanner into reporting false results. At the current stage, we cannot make any guarantees. If you are using this tool during a pentest, it might be smart to rescan with other scanners (like the recently released padcheck tool from our colleague Craig Young) to find the ground truth (this is good advice in general, since other mainstream scanners likely have the same issues). Note however that it is very unlikely that the scanner reports a false positive on a padding oracle scan.


    Conclusion

    There are still a lot of padding oracle vulnerabilities out there - and a lot of them are still unpatched. We hope you will find some bugs with the tool :) Happy H4cking :D


    Acknowlegements

    This is joint work from Robert Merget (@ic0nz1), Juraj Somorovsky (@jurajsomorovsky),  Nimrod Aviram (@NimrodAviram), Janis Fliegenschmidt (@JanisFliegens), Craig Young (@craigtweets), Jörg Schwenk (@JoergSchwenk) and (Yuval Shavitt).

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    2020. május 5., kedd

    Airba.sh - A POSIX-compliant, Fully Automated WPA PSK Handshake Capture Script Aimed At Penetration Testing



    Airbash is a POSIX-compliant, fully automated WPA PSK handshake capture script aimed at penetration testing. It is compatible with Bash and Android Shell (tested on Kali Linux and Cyanogenmod 10.2) and uses aircrack-ng to scan for clients that are currently connected to access points (AP). Those clients are then deauthenticated in order to capture the handshake when attempting to reconnect to the AP. Verification of a captured handshake is done using aircrack-ng. If one or more handshakes are captured, they are entered into an SQLite3 database, along with the time of capture and current GPS data (if properly configured).
    After capture, the database can be tested for vulnerable router models using crackdefault.sh. It will search for entries that match the implemented modules, which currently include algorithms to compute default keys for Speedport 500-700 series, Thomson/SpeedTouch and UPC 7 digits (UPC1234567) routers.

    Requirements
    WiFi interface in monitor mode aircrack-ng SQLite3 openssl for compilation of modules (optional) wlanhc2hcx from hcxtools
    In order to log GPS coordinates of handshakes, configure your coordinate logging software to log to .loc/*.txt (the filename can be chosen as desired). Airbash will always use the output of cat "$path$loc"*.txt 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==0; END{print}', which equals to reading all .txt files in .loc/ and picking the second line. The reason for this way of implementation is the functionality of GPSLogger, which was used on the development device.

    Calculating default keys
    After capturing a new handshake, the database can be queried for vulnerable router models. If a module applies, the default keys for this router series are calculated and used as input for aircrack-ng to try and recover the passphrase.

    Compiling Modules
    The modules for calculating Thomson/SpeedTouch and UPC1234567 (7 random digits) default keys are included in src/
    Credits for the code go to the authors Kevin Devine and [peter@haxx.in].
    On Linux:
    gcc -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -funroll-all-loops -o modules/st modules/stkeys.c -lcrypto
    gcc -O2 -o modules/upckeys modules/upc_keys.c -lcrypto
    If on Android, you may need to copy the binaries to /system/xbin/ or to another directory where binary execution is allowed.

    Usage
    Running install.sh will create the database, prepare the folder structure and create shortlinks to both scripts which can be moved to a directory that is on $PATH to allow execution from any location.
    After installation, you may need to manually adjust INTERFACE on line 46 in airba.sh. This will later be determined automatically, but for now the default is set to wlan0, to allow out of the box compatibility with bcmon on Android.
    ./airba.sh starts the script, automatically scanning and attacking targets that are not found in the database. ./crackdefault.sh attempts to break known default key algorithms.
    To view the database contents, run sqlite3 .db.sqlite3 "SELECT * FROM hs" in the main directory.

    Update (Linux only ... for now):
    Airbash can be updated by executing update.sh. This will clone the master branch into /tmp/ and overwrite the local files.

    Output
    _n: number of access points found
    __c/m: represents client number and maximum number of clients found, respectively
    -: access point is blacklisted
    x: access point already in database
    ?: access point out of range (not visible to airodump anymore)

    The Database
    The database contains a table called hs with seven columns.
    id: incrementing counter of table entries
    lat and lon: GPS coordinates of the handshake (if available)
    bssid: MAC address of the access point
    essid: Name identifier
    psk: WPA Passphrase, if known
    prcsd: Flag that gets set by crackdefault.sh to prevent duplicate calculation of default keys if a custom passphrase was used.
    Currently, the SQLite3 database is not password-protected.


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    2020. május 1., péntek

    Monster Boy And The Cursed Kingdom Review (Steam)

    Written by Alexander O. Cuaycong


    Title: Monster Boy and the Cursed Kingdom
    Developer: Game Atelier
    Publisher: FDG Entertainment
    Genre: Action, Adventure
    Price: $29.99
    Also Available On: Switch, PS4, XB1



    Based solely on how Monster Boy and the Cursed Kingdom looks and feels, Game Atelier clearly put a lot of heart into its creation. From its stylistic art design to its tight, metroidvania gameplay, it presents itself with aplomb — no small feat considering its history. Having descended from the lauded Wonder Boy franchise that used to grace arcade machines and Sega consoles alike, it had huge shoes to fill upon its release.

    In Monster Boy and the Cursed Kingdom, players control Jin, a young boy who journeys out to stop Nabu, his uncle, from causing havoc across the land. Nabu had been turning people into animals, and by standing up to his uncle, Jin put himself in danger, and soon finds himself turned into an animal as well. In order to undo this animal curse, he must find and make use of five special animal orbs scattered throughout the land. Only by harnessing their power can he hope to right the wrongs that his uncle had made, and undo the spell that keeps them bound as they are.




    Monster Boy and the Cursed Kingdom has a simple a premise as can be expected from the series, and it unfolds pleasantly. From the moment the game starts, its artstyle simply pops off the screen with its bright visual design and old-style anime aesthetics. Monster designs are particularly nice to look at, and serve as simple but effective callbacks to a much simpler time, when games weren't rendered three-dimensionally, but were instead two-dimensional art assets made with much care and love.

    Just as well-crafted as the aesthetics are the stages themselves. While Monster Boy and the Cursed Kingdom's gameplay is standard metroidvania, it boasts of levels that rise above the usual dregs of the genre. For the most part, they manage to be just right, both in terms of presentation and length. They never outstay their welcome, and are often presented with various twists in their design that force the player to make use of many animal forms to progress. While some of these levels require back-tracking, they never really feels like busywork. Every new obstacle surpassed feels like an actual accomplishment, and in many ways, the endeavor encourages and rewards players to explore the environment and to not be afraid to take their time.




    This does, however, open up some core issues in the game itself. While exploring Monster Boy and the Cursed Kingdom's levels can be fun and entertaining, engaging in combat is anything but. Its controls are responsive, but the general lack of weight of battles feels quite strange. It never kills the enjoyment, but it does leave encounters with enemies feeling less satisfying than they normally should be, as these tend to lack impact and feel more like minor obstacles than challenges of strength.

    Monster Boy and the Cursed Kingdom's puddle design is another cause for concern. It varies wildly from straight-forward and fun, to rather cryptic and confusing. While it's not usually a problem, it can really dampen gamers' enjoyment and sense of accomplishment, especially when parts of the game can drag along purely because of the puzzle's existence.




    All in all, though, Monster Boy and the Forgotten Kingdom is a worthy purchase for any fan of side-scrolling metroidvania. Minor issues do exist, but gamers can easily breeze past these and tear into its plentiful content without too much of a fuss. Highly recommended.



    THE GOOD
    • Tight, responsive controls, with very fluid and intuitive gameplay
    • Great art and aesthetic design
    • Plenty of hours of well-designed side-scrolling content available

    THE BAD
    • Some cryptic puzzles can kill pacing
    • Combat tends to lack impact for the most part


    RATING: 8.5/10

    A Brief Discussion About Newsgames

    In contemporary times, games have undoubtedly taken a protagonist role in different areas. We can find games as educational tools, in marketing campaigns, training employees in companies or just entertaining certain audiences. Games are a powerful media and a rich platform to share meaningful messages.

    Based on these thoughts, games also can be used as a platform for journalism content. It is possible to think strategically the use of games to spread news, discuss current events or critically think about one specific subject discussed in the media. This category of game can be considered what some specialists call "newsgame".



    About the use of games in this field, it is relevant to emphasize that "journalism can and will embrace new modes of thinking about news in addition to new modes of production. Rather than just tack-on a games desk or hire an occasional developer on contract, we contend that newsgames will offer valuable contributions only when they are embraced as a viable method of practicing journalism – albeit a different kind of journalism than newspapers, television, and web pages offer" (BOGOST; FERRARI; SCHWEIZER, 2010, p.10).

    In the book entitled "Newsgames: journalism at play" (2010), Bogost, Ferrari and Schweizer discuss several categories of this type of game. In this post I want to highlight one of them: the "current event games". According to these authors, this kind of newsgame aims to dwell over some fact occurring in this moment in the world using a ludic interface.

    One interesting case of "current event games" that we can bring to this post is the experimental game September 12th. Created by the Uruguayan game designer and researcher Gonzalo Frasca, September 12th suggests a reflection about the day after the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11th; the interface shows a Middle-Eastern village with some terrorists with weapons and civilians and the only thing you can do is aim and shoot bombs to kill the characters. The interesting thing is: every time you kill a terrorist you also kill civilians and other civilians around – when noticing the fact – become new terrorists in an infinite cycle of death and violence (BOGOST; FERRARI; SCHWEIZER, 2010, p.11, 12 & 13).

    In the video below it is possible to understand the gameplay:



    Once again, games are occupying an even more relevant role in the contemporary scenario. The gaming use for news is one more aspect to reflect on how ludic languages can reach different audiences in the quotidian life. If you are interested in this gaming category, I strongly suggest the site Molle Industria to try other examples of newsgames.

    #GoGamers



    Reference:

    BOGOST, Ian; FERRARI, Simon; SCHWEIZER, Bobby. Newsgames: journalism at play. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2010.